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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
 
Difficulties and Opportunities in Building Resilient Clinical Monitoring Systems with 
Wireless Sensor Networks 
by 
Rahav Dor 
Master of Science in Computer Engineering 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013 
Research Advisor:  Professor Chenyang Lu 
 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) can play an important role in improving patient care by collecting 
continuous vital signs and using it, in real-time, for clinical decision support. This Masters Thesis 
presents the architecture of, and our experiences with such a system. Our system encompasses 
portable wireless pulse oximeters, a wireless relay network spanning multiple hospital floors, and 
integration into the hospital Clinical Data Repository (CDR) database. We report our experience and 
lessons learned from a 14-month clinical trial of the system in six hospital wards of Barnes-Jewish 
Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri. 
 
Such a deployment of a computer system around people daily lives makes it a Cyber Physical System 
(CPS) and exposes numerous challenges, where the advantages of WSN (for example being very low 
power) are in conflict with the unforgiving environment (for example overcoming interference in a 
heavily populated hospital, despite a low power transmission). As this Masters Thesis will show such 
a CPS can be made reliable, but there are numerous integration points in which the system can (and 
did) fail. Our experiences show the feasibility of achieving reliable vital sign collection, using a 
x 
 
wireless sensor network integrated with hospital IT infrastructure and procedures. We highlight 
technical and non-technical elements that pose challenges in a real-world hospital environment and 
provide guidelines for successful and efficient deployment of similar systems. At the end of this 
paper we hope that we will have given enough evidence and recommendations to convince the 
reader that the question “Can CPS that uses a WSN enjoy the advantages of very low power wireless 
communication, and be made reliable in a hospital environment?” is no longer open. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Early detection of clinical deterioration is essential to improving clinical outcome. Study 
has shown that 4 – 17% of patients will undergo cardiopulmonary or respiratory arrest 
while in the hospital as a result of clinical deterioration [1]. However, even following 
acute operations nurses measure the vital signs only 10 times during the first 24 hours 
[2], and much less vital sign taking is performed in less acute care hospital wards. 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) can enable real time detection of clinical deterioration 
by collecting continuous vital signs from patients, providing continuous coverage and 
alerts that could save lives. WSN also have the advantage that patients do not need to 
stay confined to their beds to benefit from monitoring. Compared to commercial 
telemetry systems, WSNs based on low-power network have advantages in both power 
efficiency and cost-effective deployment without fixed infrastructure [3]; and they are 
also an apt choice for field deployments. 
 
While earlier deployment of WSNs in hospitals have shown promise [3, 4, 5, 6], they are 
not sufficient (including our own previous deployment) for clinical detection because 
their standalone WSNs are not integrated with the hospital’s Clinical Data Repository 
(CDR1) and IT infrastructure and procedures – two key integration challenges that must 
be addressed in order to build clinical warning systems. Moreover, existing deployments 
tend to be limited to a single ward, while large-scale and long-term deployments 
spanning multiple clinical wards are needed to demonstrate the feasibility of WSN 
technology in hospitals. Such systems, deployed in close proximity people’s habitats, for 
                                                
1 The CDR is typically used for data analysis, clinical research, and training and is separate from the 
production EMR (Electronic Medical Records), but it offers similar integration challenges in terms of 
hospital IT security procedures, and using the same data transport and messaging system for integrating 
between our system and the hospital system. 
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the benefit of people are Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). The continuous rub between 
people and the CPS surface challenges that must be addressed for the system to be 
reliable. 
 
Our system and longitudinal clinical trial exercised these rub points and this Masters 
Thesis presents the architecture and deployment of our end-to-end clinical monitoring 
system. Our system integrates portable wireless pulse oximeters for patients, wireless 
relay networks spanning multiple hospital floors and wards, and departmental servers 
communicating with the hospital’s Clinical Data Repository (CDR) database. This study 
is distinguished from the previous by the CDR integration and the study’s scale. 
Exposing at least some of the rub points that similar CPS will encounter (we in fact 
suggest that any CPS deployment around people’s daily lives will face similar challenges 
and could benefit from the recommendations we make). The system collects real-time 
vital sign data from the pulse-oximeters, transmits it to base stations over the wireless 
relay networks, and then feeds the data to CDR in real time, where it resides along with 
an historical corpus of the traditional clinical data. This enriched CDR data is then used 
to detect clinical deterioration using data mining techniques [1]. At the end of our 
clinical trial the system has been deployed for 14 months at Barnes-Jewish Hospital in 
St. Louis, with the first ward deployed in April 2011. The system spans three hospital 
floors, monitor patients in four floors, six wards, has between 14 to 16 wireless ”relay” 
nodes in each ward, four fixed ”base station” servers, and is integrated to the legacy 
hospital CDR systems. 
 
Although our deployment’s CDR integration, spatial scope, and duration may appear to 
have subtle differences from prior studies, these differences have had a surprisingly 
profound effect on the system’s performance with many important design 
considerations for future deployments. The key lessons we learned are: (1) Multiple base 
stations can be used to increase the network reliability and resilience to hospital events. 
(2) Fault tolerant design is necessary to progress towards production-wordy CPS 
deployments. (3) We (re)discover the importance of end user indicators. (4) As part of 
the planning process, human factors must be addressed before the deployment starts. 
   3 
 
(5) Hospital deployments must be treated fundamentally differently from lab (and even 
small scale, real) deployments, which typically focus on system issues. They must be 
engineered from the ground up to consider organization IT and hospital procedures. 
 
The lessons learned during this deployment can serve as guidelines for future clinical 
deployments of WSN-based systems, and more generally to any large WSN deployment 
in the physical world where people presence is expected. 
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Chapter 2 
  
Overview of the Clinical Trial 
 
This fourteen month clinical trial is a joint research among Washington University 
School of Engineering, Washington University School of Medicine, and Barnes Jewish 
Hospital (BJH). The system deployed during this trial collects blood oxygenation and 
heart rate readings from consented patients every 1 minute. These readings are collected 
with the eventual goal of predicting patient deterioration by combining real-time vital 
signs of a patient with traditional clinical data of (similar) patients available in CDR. 
 
The system discussed in this paper is part of a long-term effort to improve hospital care 
through prediction of imminent clinical deterioration and enabling physicians and 
nurses to render information-guided, and timely, attention to their patients. Our 
ultimate objective is to improve people’s health, recovery during hospitalization, and 
reduce hospital readmission by extending the system reach to patient’s homes. In order 
to achieve these goals we envision a novel two-tier system for clinical early warning [1]. 
The first tier uses data mining algorithms on existing hospital data records to identify 
patients at risk of clinical deterioration. Those identified patients will wear low-power, 
compact sensing devices that will collect and communicate real-time vital signs through 
a WSN. The second tier combines both the real-time sensor data and traditional clinical 
data to predict clinical deterioration, as well as suggest the most relevant clinical reasons 
based on data mining algorithms. This point is wordy of a short reminder for future 
studies. Even though the part of the system described in [1] showed that clinical events 
could be detected with accuracy of 0.9292 our physician collaborators wants more, and 
rightfully so. Because an early warning, rendered by the system before the onset of 
clinical conditions is detectable to the naked eye or by examination, is not practically 
useful. An expert system that will provide clues as for the possible reasons of the 
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eminent deterioration is required. High-level description of the two-tier system 
architecture and preliminary results on the early warning, based on traditional clinical 
data (tier-1) was presented in [1], followed by an in-depth study of data mining 
algorithms for traditional clinical data presented in [7]. This Thesis is focused on the 
question weather it is realistic to build such systems with using WSN technology. 
 
2.1 Patient Enrollment 
 
In this sub-section we provide some details on the participant sample population and 
anecdotal field observations. A tier-1 data mining algorithm runs on the CDR database 
to identify patient at risk and alerts the study coordinator. The coordinator then tried to 
consent the patient to participate in the clinical trial. Table 2.1 presents the results of 
this enrollment process: Of the total of 355 patients tier-1 module triggered on, data 
was collected from 75 patients, another 12 consented but did not have data collected 
(this could occur, for example, when the device is not turned ON after placing it on a 
patient), and 42 refused consent. The remaining patients did not have the opportunity 
to consent due to their medical condition (being in contact isolation, not in their room 
when the study coordinator went to consent them, or were too sick to respond, and so 
on. See the table for more details). Beyond these 355 patients, an additional 173 patients 
were excluded from the table because they were discharged from the hospital before 
enrollment. 
 
Table 2.1 Patient consent results. 
Status Count Percent 
Consented 75 21.1 
Consented, but not data was collected 12 3.4 
Refused consent 42 11.8 
Contact isolation 131 36.9 
Not available or responsive 67 18.9 
Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) 15 4.2 
Not appropriate per nursing 10 2.8 
Dementia 3 0.9 
Total 355 100.00 
   6 
 
 
Tables 2.2 present the demographics of the 75 volunteers. The mean age of participants 
was 58 years. 
 
Table 2.2 Demographics of the 75 consented patients. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Field Feedback 
 
At the end of the trial we asked the study coordinator, who was responsible for 
consenting patients and applying patient devices, for her observations. We were 
interested in the participants’ motivations, complaints, and experience wearing the 
device. These anecdotes are paraphrased below. 
 
Patients volunteered due to their awareness of benefits to future treatment. 
Most complaints were regarding the inconvenience of the device, possibly due 
to other equipment they wore. Importantly it centered around mobility and their 
ability to perform ADL’s (activity of daily living). Participation of some subjects 
was short, in part due to a short hospital stay, but we had a few patients with 
long term participation (three days) without any problems or complications. The 
majority of issues required going back to the participant’s room to investigate 
the patient device.  
 
There are many factors that affect how long a volunteer would give up her or his time 
and comfort to advance science, in particular in time of illness. Figure 4.5 plots the time 
each patient wore our device and a histogram of the data. The left figure shows that 
participation time did not improve as our clinical trial progressed. This is contrary to 
Race Count 
Black 30 
Caucasian 40 
Other 5 
Total 75 
Gender Count 
Female 51 
Male 24 
Total 75 
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what we expected because over the life of the trial we have introduced posters to 
advertise the study and its importance. We have also added a short promotion pep talk 
given by the study coordinator when she consented volunteers. 
 
The histogram on the right of Figure 2.1 shows that the two greatest groups of 
volunteers either wore the device less than 10 hours or between 20 to 30 hours. 
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Figure 2.1 A plot of the time each patient wore the device through the trial duration 
(ordered by date), and a histogram showing the distribution of this time. 
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Chapter 3 
 
System Architecture 
 
In this section we discuss the architecture of the clinical monitoring system and debate 
which type of wireless network would be appropriate in a clinical setting. The system 
consists of three major components. Patients wear a wireless patient device that collects 
vital sign data (specifically, blood oxygenation and pulse data) during their hospital stay. 
As vitals are collected, the patient device transmits the data to a wireless relay network 
deployed throughout the hospital wards where our clinical trial is running. The relays 
form a low-power wireless mesh network that carries the vital sign data from the patient 
devices to our servers (referred to as base stations). The base stations act as an interface 
between the WSN and the hospital’s IT systems (via wired Ethernet) and feed real-time 
vital sign data to the CDR database. The base stations also provide network monitoring 
and logging services that have been invaluable to system performance evaluation during 
our clinical trial. 
 
The patient device and wireless relay networks reuse the same design from an earlier 
clinical trial detailed in [3], while the base station software has been extended 
substantially with new services to support the CDR integration and network 
monitoring. The key distinctions between this study and the earlier study reported in [3] 
are three-fold: (1) The integration with the hospital IT infrastructure and CDR 
compared to standalone WSN. (2) A large-scale, multi-floor and multi-ward deployment 
compared to single-ward deployment. (3) Ours is a longitudinal study (14 months). 
Each of these characteristics led to important new architecture and code-based for our 
system, as well as operational challenges and insights – as reported in this paper. 
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3.1 Patient Device 
 
Each patient device integrates a TelosB [8] mote running the TinyOS [9] operating 
system, with a Nellcor pulse oximeter sensor [10], attached to the patient’s finger to 
collect pulse rate and blood oxygenation level (SpO2). Nellcor’s sensors use color-coded 
connectors; the appliance developed for the first study is compatible with the purple 
coded sensors. Nellcor offers a number of sensors, prescribed according to the patient 
body weight, duration of monitoring, and activity level. Some sensor models are 
disposable and some reusable. We were interested in long participation periods and as a 
result we were attentive to the connivance of having sensors being attached to the 
patient for long durations and their reliability due to movement. Therefore, as part of 
this research we performed a mini-study with and determined that the finger sensor 
model MAX-A (adhesive, disposable) was the most convenient both for placement as 
well as wearing. This is the only model that we ended up using throughout the trial. The 
-A denotes a short cable, which suited our patients, but a longer -AL model is also 
available. Other models that could be use are the SC-A that uses Velcro instead of an 
adhesive and should be used when the patient has fragile skin. This model also utilizes a 
high-efficiency LED to enhance pulse acquisition for patient with thicker, darkly 
pigmented skin, or weak pulses. We have never gotten around to actually using this 
model because patient’s characteristics were not available when the system alerted the 
study coordinator with a candidate patient. In retrospect this was unfortunate because 
we have lost some patient data exactly to those reasons. The Dura-Y (an ear sensor that 
can also be placed on the finger) sensor, which was recommended by BJC nurses, was 
not used in our trial because it was harder to apply and frequently fell off. For research 
and development in the Engineering lab we used the reusable DS100A-1 model because 
it was very convenient to quickly apply to oneself. Figure 3.1 provides a photo of the 
patient device and a data flow diagram of the vital signs in the patient device. 
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Figure 3.1 An open patient device with a 
MAX-A sensor attached is shown on the 
left. 
The data flow diagram below shows, from 
left to right, the vital signs path through 
the device. The Nellcor sensor acquires 
heart rate and blood oxygenation and the 
OxiLink interface interprets the light 
absorption to digital data. The interface 
board connects the OxiLink RS232 output 
with a TelosB Mote. 
 
 
The sensor operates by emitting red and infrared light through the body to a 
photodetector. The photodetector's output is wired to an interface called OxiLink made 
by Smith Medical. interface [11], which interprets the light absorption data to provide 
meaningful heart rate and blood oxygenation readings. A custom circuit board built for 
the previous study is used to interface the OxiLink RS232 output with the TelosB and 
to perform voltage conversions needed to physically interface the device's constituent 
parts. A 9V battery powers the entire patient appliance. The software we authored for 
the TelosB controls the power to the sensor and thus collects data at a rate of 1 reading 
per minute; otherwise it shuts down the power to conserve battery. After receiving a 
sensor reading the TelosB routes the data to the relay infrastructure discussed in the 
following subsection using its onboard CC2420 [12] radio. The patient’s device locate 
relays using the Dynamic Relay Association Protocol (DRAP) [13], a one-hop protocol 
specifically designed to locate a larger routing infrastructure under mobility. 
 
3.2 Relays Network 
 
WSN network coverage is achieved by plugging TelosB nodes into electrical outlets in 
patients’ rooms, offices, and elsewhere where it seemed spatially reasonable. The relay 
devices use their onboard radios to form a mesh network based on the IEEE 802.15.4 
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low-power wireless networking standard [14]. Figure 3.2 presents a high-level carton of 
the resulting network topology. The Collection Tree Protocol (CTP) [15] is employed 
on the relay nodes to establish data collection trees rooted at a base station. 802.15.4 
wireless links are highly dynamic, due to factors such as external interference. Hence, 
CTP is a dynamic routing protocol that uses periodic beacon messages to maintain the 
routing infrastructure, autonomously changing the links used to route packets as their 
reliability varies over time. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 A high-level view of the network topology. The figure shows the ward floor 
and number, e.g. 11-1 is ward 1 on the 11th floor. Each WSN cloud is attached to a 
single base station at a certain time, but the sensors participating in each cloud do 
dynamically change cloud membership in response to changing environmental 
conditions, and each cloud can be rooted in a different base station for the same 
reasons. Each base station interface to the legacy hospital CDR via MQ Series (by IBM) 
that transports data between both ends. 
 
In addition to patient data, relay nodes send “beacon” packets to a base station at a rate 
of one packet per minute. These beacons provide diagnostic information about the 
network’s operation even when no patients are enrolled. 
 
A subtle but important feature of CTP is that each relay aims to find a high-quality path 
to some base station, not any base station in particular. Multiple base stations may be 
deployed in the same network to provide redundancy, a feature we exploited in our 
deployment. As we will discuss later in this paper this decision had a profound (and 
sometimes surprising) impact on our network’s behavior. 
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Figure 3.3 presents a snapshot of our relay deployment, taken at a point when our 
network was deployed in five wards on three hospital floors (11, 12, and 14). Each ward 
was equipped with 14–16 relay nodes and one base station. Black arrows indicate the 
links used to form the network’s routing trees. As discussed above the routing paths are 
highly dynamic and thus this snapshot frequently changed. Light purple circles denote 
the infrastructure relays. Darker purple denote base stations. Red shows relays that are 
currently disconnected from the base stations. The bottom left side of the image shows 
the network on 11th floor and its two base stations, number 50 on the bottom left and 
52 on the center right. The bottom right part of the figure shows the network on the 
12th floor and its base station 60. The top of the image shows the 14th floor and its base 
station 73. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Relays infrastructure across five hospital wards. 
 
We expected that the respective wards would generally form their own isolated routing 
paths and that connections among wards would be rare. Nevertheless we placed all the 
relays on the same wireless channel (allowing any relay to theoretically connect to any 
base station) and deployed several relays in the corridors between the two wards on the 
11th floor. Our intention was to provide resilience against base station failure by allowing 
relays in one ward to send their data to the base station in another ward, in case of a 
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need. However, as shown in figure 3.3, the relays routinely formed links across wards. 
Moreover, because the 12th floor deployment was directly above the 11th floor, routing 
trees often crossed through the ceiling and floor despite (as we’ve been told) each floor 
being a tick slab of concrete, metal, and other infrastructure). We also discovered that 
the 11th floor infrastructure could reliably collect data from patients in the 
corresponding 10th floor wards, even without any relays installed on the 10th floor. We 
discuss these observations later in the paper. The 14th floor deployment was located two 
floors above and in a different section of the building and remained isolated for the 
duration of the deployment. 
 
3.3 Base Stations 
 
Each base station consists of a laptop with USB-attached TelosB mote, and acts as an 
interface between the 802.15.4 network and the hospital’s wired Ethernet infrastructure. 
The base stations are Intel based machines running the Microsoft Windows XP 
operating system. The base station manager software is authored in Python and Java 
(two languages where used for reasons explained below). We installed a SSH Server on 
the machines to allow us to remotely administer them. Each base station is deployed 
with base station manager software that we authored with the core functionality 
depicted in Figure 3.4. As vital signs produced by patients arrive from the relays mesh 
network to the mote attached to one of the base stations, the base station software 
consumes the vital sign data. 
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Figure 3.4 Data flow through the data collection system. 
 
Data arrives from the wireless network to the mote attached to the USB port of a base 
station. A module called Raw2Obj (not in the figure), and SerialForwarder (which is part of 
TinyOS tool-chain) convert the raw data into packets. Raw2Obj was not developed by 
this project. It is part of a software library called WSNtestBed developed at our lab for 
running our motes test bed. We note that SerialForwarder could assume Raw2Object 
functionality now that Jython is an integral part of the software stack. We added 
SerialForwarder to our architecture because instead of directly connecting (and blocking) 
to the USB port, SerialForwarder allows multiple applications to consume the data by 
providing a TCP socket. Our software, the Basestation manager, is one of the consumers 
of this socket. 
 
Two types of packets arrive to each base station: network status (beacons”) and 
patients’ vital signs. Both are saved in a local SQL DB; with the vital signs also 
formatted as HL7 messages, which are then sent to the hospital CDR via a message 
queue MQ. The other data paths of the system (System calls, Periodic stats, and Log) are 
described in the next sub-sections. 
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3.3.1 Software Stack 
 
The base station software is an evolution of software (first version was authored in 
Python) we used in prior studies. Predominately, the addition of Java was driven by the 
need to use a Java based MQ library because the Python based MQ was too costly for 
our research budget. Data is exchanged between Python and Java classes was made 
possible by using Jython [16], which is an implementation of the Python programming 
language in Java. As such, it provides a seamless objects exchange between the two 
languages. This functionality is denoted in Figure 3.5 as Native Python/Java interaction 
layer. Furthermore, we purposefully chose an ODBC driver provided by Jython. Thus, 
through this Python/Java interaction layer, Python modules running on the base station 
can talk to the DB directly, and since the DB driver is authored in Java it makes the DB 
natively accessible for the Java modules as well. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Base station software stack (major components) 
 
Service wrapper allows our system to run as an OS service (always working and available 
whenever the OS is available). The SSH server allows us remote access for system 
administration; Depending on the circumstances, we sometimes found that either SSH 
or Windows Remote Desktop were more convenient. Surprisingly there were cases where 
only one of them gave us access, which of course occurred when we needed it most, so 
having both saved us a few trips to the hospital. The OS libs interfaces allowed us to query 
the OS, DB, and machine. 
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3.3.2 Health Level 7 
 
The vital signs arriving to the Base station manager are formatted according to the 
international Health Level Seven (HL7) standard [19] with a converter built on top the 
HAPI library [20]. The module named HL7 Formatter in the Figure 3.4 depicts this 
functionality. The HL7-formatted vital sign data are then inserted to a Message Queue 
(MQ) that reliably transports it to the hospital CDR, over the hospital’s wired Ethernet 
network. This particular deployment used the IBM WebSphere MQ library [21] for 
consistency with existing hospital IT systems. 
 
3.3.3 SQL Database 
 
The vital signs the network activity are written to the local SQL DB. The base station 
manager also logs any important event occurring on the system itself to a local 
sequential file. In this implementation we have used the PostgreSQL database [18] 
version 9.x. 
 
The DB consist of 2 active tables: 
• paths – a time stamped log of the path via which each node was connected to a 
base station. Every 1 minute (assuming that a node had a path to a base station 
at that point in time) each node path is recorder. 
• vitals – in which the patients vital signs are stored 
 
The vitals tables stores all data messages received from patients, including invalid 
readings. To filter erroneous messages queries on the vitals table should include (among 
other filters needed for your desired query) the clause: 
 
where	  systemFlags	  =	  0	  and	  signalLevel	  >=	  2	  and	  avgSpO2	  !=	  127	  and	  
heartRate	  !=	  255	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The data base also has 4 tables (receive_log, send_log, stats, timing) that are leftovers 
from the prior study and were kept in our project only to for compatibility with the 
existing code base. 
 
When a consolidated view of the data was desired the databases from the four base 
stations where replicated to my laptop and a merged database for analysis was created. 
Databases DB50-End, DB52-End, DB60-End, where DB## designate the base station 
ID and End designate data at the End of the trial are available. The consolidated 
database is named RDS_Analysis-End. This database also contains an additional table 
named vitalsFromKevin that holds vitals signs data as they were stored in the legacy 
CDR. 
The paths table in the consolidated database was cleaned from erroneous records using 
the following query, and the analysis presented in this paper was done against the patch_c 
table: 
 
create	  table	  paths_c	   -­‐-­‐	  c	  =	  clean	  
as	  select	  *	  from	  paths	  
	  	  	  where	  (	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (node	  between	  100	  and	  180)	  	  	  -­‐-­‐	  skip	  181,	  has	  only	  1	  record	  
	  	  	  	  or	  (node	  between	  182	  and	  187)	  	  	  -­‐-­‐	  188,	  sends	  multiple	  packets	  
per	  minute,	  probably	  due	  to	  
hardware	  failure	  
	  	  	  	  or	  (node	  between	  189	  and	  198)	  	  	  -­‐-­‐	  199,	  has	  only	  1	  record	  
	  	  	  	  or	  (node	  between	  200	  and	  216)	  	  	  -­‐-­‐	  currently	  last	  node	  ID	  in	  the	  
deployment	  is	  208,	  our	  
temporary	  mote	  experiments	  
starts	  at	  217	  
	  	  	  	  )	  
 
When using the vitals signs data as it appears in the hospital CDR, the vitalsFromKevin 
tables should be used. This table designates missing vital signs as records with status -1 
(a patient is suppose to have a vital sign reading every minute). In queries where only 
the received vital signs data is of interest use the following query (among other filters 
needed for your desired query) to filter those out: 
 
where	  not	  ("O2_status"	  =	  -­‐1	  or	  "pulse_status"	  =	  -­‐1)	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3.3.4 Continuous Operation 
 
Because vital signs arrive in an asynchronous and continuous manner a malfunctioning 
base station means loss of data. To allow the base station software to operate 
continuously (for example following loss of power or mandatory operating system 
restarts after installing patches) we used a Service Wrapper that enables Java 
applications to be run as a Windows Service or UNIX Daemon. In this implementation 
we used the Tanuki [17] Java Service Wrapper. Tanuki also provides tools to monitors 
the health of the application and the JVM it run on. Running as an OS service starts our 
application as part of every Windows boot process. 
 
3.3.5 Network Monitoring 
 
An important feature of our base station software is a suite of network monitoring 
services that have proven invaluable for the maintenance. For diagnostic and debugging 
purposes, each base station is equipped with a database server (in this implementation 
PostgreSQL) that is used to locally log all messages received from the relay network (in 
the paths table). This log includes the relays’ diagnostic beacons, which are not 
forwarded to the hospital CDR. Extraordinary events are also logged in a time-stamped 
sequential file for easy access. 
 
3.3.6 System’s Vital Signs 
 
To track the base stations’ health each server produces and emails a nightly report every 
24 hours (configurable). In addition to the information contained in each report the 
email itself has proven to be a useful diagnostic tool during the trial: failing to receive a 
report is a good early indicator that a base station is disconnected or otherwise 
malfunctioning. The key sections of this automatically generated and emailed report are 
described in the Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Among other items each report lists the patient 
devices that sent data to this base station in the past 24 hours, the number of vital sign 
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readings for each device, a list of relays and their current path to the base station, the 
status of the local PostgreSQL database, network connections, the status of the attached 
mote, and the state of other hardware sub-systems such as storage. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 The Network Interface (access to the hospital Ethernet) and attached Mote 
sections of the periodic status report; as well as all of the relays that are in this base 
station’s cloud and their path to the base station. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Since our base stations were based on laptops, which were often 
disconnected from a power source, it became important to know if it is connected to a 
power source (ACLineStatusText) and the expected time the battery has left. Also 
reported are the status of the DB and other general resources of the machine. 
 
Most of these pieces of information require access to the local OS service libraries. We 
have achieved this functionality using a Java library called Java Native Access (JNA) 
[22]. 
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To help us understand the network performance we developed a utility that queries all 
base stations paths tables, each base station at a time, and draws map the network 
topology of the last 15 minutes. Figure 3.3 presents an example topology map produced 
by this utility. These maps have been particularly useful for identifying network failures 
caused by equipment disconnections, which we discuss in more detail in section 4.1. 
 
3.4 Network Type 
 
Any system’s architecture, working in a certain cyber and physical environments, would 
have advantages and drawbacks owing to the type of wireless network in use. As any 
design alternatives we believe that such questions should not be religiously considered, 
that the preferred network will need to be evaluated between major releases, and that 
even for a given point in time there is more than a single good choice. In this section we 
offer our design considerations as they were in the beginning of the research endeavor, 
along with some alternatives that become more relevant as the trial ended. 
 
Unsurprisingly, WLAN (IEEE 802.11, or informally WiFi) [30] seems to offer an 
advantage because it was already installed in the hospital. However in closer analysis we 
found out that while that WiFi network is available almost everywhere in the hospital, 
reception is sporadic in different sections of the hospital. We determined that in order 
to provide good network coverage across a hospital ward, in particular due to the 
hospital environments, there is going to need to be an access point every 20 to 30 
meters. Comparing to a WSN relay that we planned to install every 10 to 20 meters 
(before we added extra relays as discussed later in this document), then, a WiFi will save 
between 40 to 67 percent of relays. However because each WiFi access point requires an 
Ethernet jack, the total cost of ownership (TCO) will be higher if WiFi is used. It is 
worth noting that we deliberately chose to use only the printed circuit board antennas of 
the relays. Had we used external antennas then the number of WiFi access points and 
WSN relays would be equivalent. 
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When considering WiFi one also need to take into account that the network may 
experience irregular congestion periods because it is not known how many guests will 
be using it during the day. There are of course medical grade (and frequency) WiFi 
networks, but BJC did not have these available; installing them would require the same 
amount of infrastructure as a regular WiFi and we wanted to offer a clinical system that 
could be deployed with minimal infrastructure. 
 
WSN offers an advantage in term of energy consumption. Typically WSN transmission 
power ratio is between -24 to 0 dBm, while WiFi is 20 to 30 dBm. This is an power 
saving factor of 1,000 to 25,000 in favor of WSN. 
 
An additional WSN advantage is the wakeup time, which is 1 to 10 ms for WSN and 
about 30 ms for WiFi. In a network of patient device that are mostly asleep and wake 
up, at most, every minute – it is an advantage in both response time and energy used 
during the wakeup period. 
 
We did not feel that a network technology such as any one of the standards (GSM, 
CDMA) available for cell phone networks due to the short distance between the patient 
devices to the base stations. However a completely different architecture, which 
connects a sensor to a smart phone provided to the patient or allocated to the room 
should be considered. The sensor(s) could communicate with the phone using Blue 
Tooth or similar network, and the phone will then serves as a mini, or full pledge, base 
station, connecting to the rest of the system. We could not explore this approach 
because it was not part of the original grant and such architecture has budget 
implications. 
 
For completion we would like to mention three additional technologies that should be 
considered in future deployments. These are Roofnet network by MIT [31], 2net by 
Qualcomm [32], and white space communication [33]. 
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We choose for our system the WSN (802.15.4) network because it could be deployed 
with little to no infrastructure, one simply need to plug a mote into a power outlet. A 
patient device wakes up every minute for a few seconds and then goes to sleep, 
therefore wakeup time was important to us. And we wanted our device to work at least 
a week with a single 9V battery. With those choices, in the beginning of the system 
development, WSN was almost the only option available. 
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Chapter 4 
 
System Reliability 
 
In this section, we analyze our deployment’s network and system reliability. We first 
assess the overall network reliability based on the beacon packets sent by each relay. 
Recall that each relay periodically sends a beacon packet to the base stations using the 
same CTP protocol used for transporting regular vital sign data. The collected beacons 
give us a comprehensive view of reliability in every area of the network even when there 
is no patient enrolled. We then provide an analysis of the reliability of vital-signs-
delivery from enrolled patients, offering a direct view of our CPS ability to deliver real-
time vital signs using a WSN. This reliability analysis shows that despite many 
improvements (articulated in chapter 5) that can still be done to our system, this WSN 
was already reliable enough despite our faults. 
 
Due to its location, the 14th floor formed its own network separate from the rest of the 
network we study here. As this single-ward network is similar to our previous 
deployment studied in [3], henceforth our analysis focuses on the challenges posed by 
the larger, multi-ward deployment on the 10th to the 12th floors. 
 
4.1 Relay Connectivity 
 
To analyze the relays availability over time we define a relay as connected based on the 
fraction of its beacon messages that were successfully delivered to at least one of the 
base stations. On each day, for each relay, we calculate the ratio of the number of 
delivered beacons to the expected 1440 beacons/day (1 beacon/minute). We note that a 
beacon message may be received by any one of the base stations due to CTP protocol’s 
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design. Our DB is distributed over a number of base stations and we will need to 
combine the queries from all of them for correct view of reliability. We define the 
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) threshold to designate relays as connected or disconnected 
each day as follows: 
 
To be connected, a relay must have successfully delivered 90% of its beacons to 
the base stations that day. 
 
Figure 4.1 plots the number of relays connected to some base station over the course of 
the deployment. The red curve indicates the number of connected relays for each day of 
the deployment, while the purple horizontal lines indicate the total number of relays 
physically deployed in the network; shaded regions mark significant events during the 
deployment that we discuss below. We note that Figure 4.1 begins at May 24, 2011: due 
to factors described in Section 5.5 (Impact of IT procedures) the diagnostic logs needed 
to produce this graph are partially incomplete between the initial deployment and May 
23; an unfortunate circumstance that mandated that we will exclude this period from 
our analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The network reliability from May 2011 to May 2012. 
 
The purple line marks the number of deployed relays. The red plot represents the 
number of relays connected to the base stations. Significant events are shaded: (a) The 
deployment was expanded to ward 3 on July 29. (b) Between August 14 to 25 base 
station 52 was unplugged from power. (c) Between Nov. 18 to 23 base station 52 did 
not work. (d) Between Feb. 10 to 23 relays disappeared again and for a while we were 
prevented from replenishing them because they were in patient isolation rooms. This 
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caused the three available base stations to receive only a fraction of their regular traffic. 
(e) On April 3 and 4 base station 52 received about half of its usual traffic for unknown 
reason; the problem resolved itself without intervention. At the end of the trial relays 
were slowly disconnected without replenishing, leading to the gradual decrease in 
reliability. 
 
Starting in April 2011, the network was deployed with 11 relays and two base stations 
(denoted 50 and 52) at two corresponding ends of wards 1 and 2. When we saw the 
poor network reliability we added 19 additional relays a few days later. Even though we 
now had good relay density, the network reliability remained poor. The reliability stayed 
unacceptable through July and we initially attributed this to relays that physically 
disappeared from the hospital, and base station issues which are discussed in the next 
section. But despite relay replenishment, our work on improving the base stations, and 
other improvements we had made to the system, it did not reach our expected level of 
reliability. On July 29, designated as event (a) in figure 4.1, the deployment was 
expanded, adding ward 3 exactly one floor above ward 2. Ward 3 was furnished with its 
own base station (denoted 60) and 16 additional relays; since ward 3 was within radio 
range of wards 1 and 2, the new relays and base stations immediately merged into the 
existing infrastructure. 
 
Admittedly more research into the affect of people on low energy networks is needed, 
but we hypothesize that the presence of people in this busy hospital, which treats about 
400 new patients each month, had a profound effect on the network performance. The 
deployment of ward 3 provided paths to base stations through the ceiling and floor, 
routes that to some extent avoided links through corridors that are may be heavily 
populated with people. 
 
During the initial deployment, we deliberately allowed ward 1 and 2 networks to merge, 
expecting that the redundancy would improve connectivity. However, even before 
significant relay disappearances took place (discussed in the next section) the network 
struggled to achieve high reliability before August. We also noticed anecdotally that the 
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network tended to route data to ward 2’s base station; even relays in ward 1 would often 
route data to ward 2 as opposed to the (geographically closer) base station in ward 1. 
This observation is also reflected in figure 4.1: when ward 1 experienced an outage from 
July 22 to July 25 (not highlighted as an event in the figure), it had little effect on 
network connectivity: the number of connected (PDR ≥ 90%) relays remained low, but 
was largely unaffected by the outage. After the expansion ward 2’s base station has also 
proved to be quite important: reliability fell greatly during event (b) between August 14 
and 25, when this base station was disconnected from power. Looking closely at the 
data from during this outage, we found that it even affected the recently deployed relays 
in ward 3. From these observations, we concluded that the two floors’ networks 
strongly depended on each other for high reliability. 
 
Even though our deployment planned for some cross-ward traffic this phenomenon 
was much more prominent over the duration of the trial than we anticipated. Figure 4.2 
shows the proportion of time each relay was connected to each base station, with the 
least favored base station (50) handling 13.4% of the traffic. It is worth noting that base 
station 50 is installed in the physicians’ consultation room, which has continuous foot 
traffic — possibly another indication to the interaction between people and WSNs. 
Remedies to these conditions is offered in the next section. 
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Figure 4.2 The percent of time relays were connected to a base station (50, 52, and 60). 
We see that almost every relay in the deployment divided its time among multiple base 
stations. 
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4.2 3D Networks 
 
Many of the motes used routes to base stations that are not near them. See for example 
the odd choice that relay #115 is making in Figure 3.3. Instead of connecting to the 
nearby base station 52 (the purple circle that just below relay 115 in the figure or is 
about 7 meters away across the corridor) it connects through the ceiling to relay 174, 
then to 152, which in turn connects to base station 52 through the floor. When we 
query the DB, it turns out that relay #115 required paths via the ceiling (and possible 
back through the floor) 45% of the time. Many other motes, in fact most of them, 
required such paths (see Figure 4.3). We name such network topology, 3D Networks. 
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Figure 4.3 The proportion-of-time motes on the 11th floor used routing paths via the 
ceiling (floor). The left plot is ordered by proportion and we see that 9 motes never 
required such paths. 
The right plot is the histogram of the data, demonstrating that most motes require 3D 
paths in high proportion of their routes. 
 
Figure 4.3 show that 9 relays (number 102, 110, 111, 118, 119, 125, 126, 128, and 177) 
did not use 3D paths. Relay 177 is the only exception in this group, using 3D path 1.8% 
of the time. Those 9 relays disappeared from the hospital before the deployment of the 
network on the 12th floor. Had they been part of the network following the 12th floor 
deployment they might have used this 3D path diversity as well. 
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Possibly more interesting investigation would reason on relays requiring 3D paths in 
more than 50% of the instances. To explain our analysis we draw your attention to 
Figure 3.3, and Tables 4.1 displaying all relays requiring 3D paths in more than 50% of 
the instances, and 4.2 requiring 3D paths in less than 50% of the instances. The tables 
list the relay#, the proportion of the instances it used 3D paths, whether a direct path to 
a nearby base station required an airway path through areas that may be with heavily 
populated, and a comments column. 
 
Table 4.1 Relays using 3D paths more than 50% of the instances. The table is sorted by 
the 3D path% column.  
Relay# 3D path% Via people Comments 
163 82% Yes 
 151 82% Yes Family waiting room 
208 79% Yes 
 191 76% Yes Family waiting room 
197 75% Yes 
 104 74% Yes Family waiting room 
195 72% Yes Family waiting room 
124 70% Yes Family waiting room 
169 69% Yes Elevator lobby 
122 69% Yes Linen closet 
171 68% Yes 
 196 67% Yes Elevator lobby 
193 67% Yes 
 131 67% Yes Nurses' station 
129 65% Yes Lead Charge Nurse office 
159 64% Yes 
 117 62% Yes 
 130 62% Yes Nurses' station 
170 61% Yes 
 185 59% Yes 
 132 59% Yes 
 173 58% Yes 
 107 55% Yes 
 120 54% Yes 
 105 53% Yes 
 161 52% Yes 
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Table 4.1 demonstrate that all relays that used 3D paths in more than 50% of the 
instances, did that despite sometimes having a more direct path to a nearby base station. 
The “Via people” column suggests that all of these plausibly more direct airways had to 
pass through areas in the hospital that, at times, are heavily populated. To the extent 
that at a given time this people/radiation interaction rendered a direct path less reliable 
the relay chose an alternate 3D path. In the “Comments” column we also offer 
additional support for this hypothesis. We see that there is a direct correspondence 
between the proportions of instances that a 3D path was required to the areas that are 
more likely to have larger amount of people. 
 
The next Table, 4.2, demonstrates that relays, which used 3D paths in less than 50% of 
the instances, were installed in areas with likely less dense population. The three 
exceptions of relays in this table that did require a passage through people are of relays 
that are 1 hop away from a nearby base station. The nearness to the base station is the 
probable cause compensating for the energy absorb by people and the reason that these 
relays appear in table 4.2 instead of 4.1. 
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Table 4.2 Relays using 3D paths less than 50% of the instances. The table is sorted by 
the 3D path% column and the rows of relays with a routing path to a base station that 
require passage through heavily populated areas are shaded. 
Relay# 3D path% Via people Comments 
114 49% No   
123 46% No   
115 45% Yes 1 hop away from BS #52 
127 44% No Staff pantry 
157 42% No   
179 38% Yes 1 hop away from BS #52 
108 36% No   
198 36% No Physician workroom 
106 34% Yes 1 hop away from BS #52 
113 28% No   
121 26% No   
153 23% No   
194 21% No   
112 19% No 1 hop away from BS #52 
103 17% No 1 hop away from BS #50 
109 14% ? Location uncertain 
177 2% No   
 
An interesting question is weather there was something special about the 11th floor that 
caused this behavior, or is the 12th floor relays going to behave in a similar way? If the 
11th floor motes seek the 12th floor infrastructure in such high proportion, will the 12th 
floor relays do without 3D paths? 
 
As an answer we provide Figure 4.3 showing the behavior of the 12th floor relays. 
Indeed, we see that most of the relays (12 out of 15) required 3D paths in more than 
50% of the routes. 
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Figure 4.4 The proportion-of-time motes on the 12th floor used routing paths via the floor 
(ceiling). The left plot is ordered by proportion. 
The right plot is the histogram of the data, demonstrating that 12 relays out of 15 required 
3D paths in more than 50% of their routes. 
 
Since we did not solidify our 3D Networks idea during the trial and the analysis we 
perform here is retrospective, further research will be needed to validate this hypothesis, 
and there may be other causes, beyond people for this behavior. It was also suggested 
by our Medical school collaborators that hospital food carts might pose a periodic daily 
problem. These metal carts are high and could act as Faraday cages, but they are not 
present in the corridors long enough (time wise) to explain such high proportion of 3D 
paths. 
 
Before the deployment in the 12th floor this need for 3D Networks critically affected 
our system performance. It is likely to affect similar CPS deployed around people’s daily 
lives. WSNs clearly offer advantages with its low energy consumption, duty cycling 
techniques, and other advancements that researchers have made in the last decade – but 
these techniques are exactly what makes a WSN sensitive to interference such as the 
presence of people. This is a quandary because we often would like to deploy CPS 
purposely around people, it is the interaction of people-and-system that makes it a CPS; 
and many of the promises of CPS (smart homes, augmented reality, smart civil 
infrastructure, disaster mediation, and so on) can be delivered only when CPS are 
deployed around people daily lives. 
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One possible (and simple) solution to this quandary, applicable to almost any 
deployment around people (including deployment with a single base station, and those 
that would not be able to take advantage of multiple floors and 3D paths) is to install 
the motes at the ceiling level. 
 
To support future researchers interested in this quandary we mention the following 
operating characteristics of our network: (1) Relays were operating only with their 
printed circuit board antennas; (2) The radio operates in the unlicensed 2.4GHz band; 
(3) All of our relays use the default 26 frequency band; (4) CTP was used for routing. In 
spot checks that we have performed at the beginning and near the end of the project 
the electromagnetic radiation at channel 26 was free of wireless interferences. An 
example to such a spectrum map is presented in Figure 4.5. Following [23] we consider 
a noise level above -85 dBm noisy enough to cause a Chipcon CC2420 radio to drop 
packets. In the example provided in the figure we see that channel 26 does not 
introduce that risk, hence packets (in this case) are not likely to be drooped due to 
interference from other electronic devices, and the interference must stem from other 
sources. 
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Figure 4.5 Spectrum map accumulated during 30 minutes observation. The X-axis 
indicates 802.15.4 channels (11 to 26). In the middle and lower figure the Y-axis 
indicates power. In the middle figure each colored dot (at position x GHz and energy 
level of y dBm) indicates how often a signal was detected for this ordered pair. The 
colors represent values in the range shown on the colorbar. Because the area over 
channel 26 has mostly blue dots (a transmission was detected close to 0.0% in this area) 
and the power is below -100 dBm (only signals above -85 dBM can interfere with a 
CC2420 radio) we conclude that channel 26 barley (or not at all) experiance 
electromagnetic interferences. 
 
Figure 4.5 suggest that frequency hoping in the environment where our system was 
deployed will not improve the network reliability because channel 26, which we used 
exclusively in our network, is completely free of interference. In fact channel hoping 
will only introduce delays, consume energy, and will lower the reliability in such cases 
because it is bound to hop into noisy channels. 
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4.3 Vital Signs Delivery 
 
The effect of the critical events in the network reliability over the trial’s lifetime surely 
affects the fraction of vital signs actually arriving to a base station from the patient. 
How bad was it, or how good was it, despite all of these adverse events it what we set to 
study in this sub-section. Figure 4.6 plots the fraction of each patient’s vital signs that 
were successfully delivered to a base station. Before the July 29 expansion the 
fluctuating quality of the routing relay infrastructure led to corresponding fluctuations in 
vital signs delivery. However, after the expansion the reliability improved dramatically. 
Before the expansion only 25.0% of the patients had at least 70% of their vital signs 
successfully delivered over the network, compared to 85.4% afterwards. A cursory look 
at the study coordinator notes on post-expansion patients and base station logs revealed 
cases of low reliability that can be attributed to extraordinary (not WSN related) factors. 
For example, one patient was enrolled when base station 52 was off (event (c)). Another 
was enrolled for only three hours during their hospital discharge, and a detailed 
examination of her/his database records shows sporadic valid readings, spread among 
long intervals with no data being received, and intervals of the network successfully 
delivering finger out of device errors. One probable cause for such a pattern could be 
that the patient was out-of-range of our deployment span during the discharge process. 
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Figure 4.6 The fraction of each patient’s vital signs data that is successfully delivered to 
a base station. 
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Delivery of at least 70% of the vital signs of 85.4% of patients does suggest that WSN 
are reliable and can be used for clinical monitoring. First and foremost, by following the 
insights we offer in Chapter 5, clinical systems can be made much more reliable from 
the get go. Second, compared to a manual process in which a nurse collects vital signs 
every few hours we are judging the system’s ability to deliver a vital sign every minute. 
Certainly the average reliability of 85.4% could be improved if we relax this demand and 
deliver, for example, a vital sign every 5 or 10 minutes. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
The system has many components such as wireless networking, multiple servers, 
embedded and regular software, and integration with CDR. We considered all of these 
pieces within the span of a CPS system, and thus our responsibility. Surprisingly, only 
few of the challenges we faced stemmed from the many integration points, or as a result 
of technology in general. While previous research focused on technological solutions, 
our experiences show that human factors may play at least an equal role in the reliability 
and usability of a CPS system. In this section we articulate the key challenges and 
provide suggestions how to avoid them in future deployment. Our discussion revolves 
around the following key types of challenges: the use of multiple base stations, the need 
for fault tolerant design, we offer some comments on obtaining correct data for 
network analysis, we re(discovery) the importance of a well designed user experience, 
the impact of IT procedures, the effects of the hospital environment, the importance of 
how things look, and we end with our comments on research administration. Each of 
the following sections will describe the challenge, the solutions that we took during the 
on going trial (if it was possible), and recommendations for future research and 
deployments. 
 
5.1 Multiple Base Stations 
 
Challenge Multiple base stations can be both a challenge and a blessing. As 
discussed in section 4.1 the importance of this added infrastructure was quite surprising 
at first as ward 3 was separated from wards 1 and 2 by a thick ceiling that is full of metal 
and other hospital building infrastructure. Before the deployment time, it was not clear 
that ward 3’s infrastructure would merge with the existing infrastructure at all, much less 
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significantly reinforce it. We do not attribute this unexpected improvement to an 
increased network density, since density was comparable in all three wards and adding 
relays did not improve the reliability. 
 
Solutions Previous studies have discussed network density in the context of area 
coverage, or added relays, but our experience suggests that such coverage alone may not 
be the only critical factor in heavily populated environments. Our experiences 
emphasize the importance of leveraging multiple base stations to enhance reliability and 
the advantages of protocols such as CTP that exploit multiple base stations 
automatically. Had we deployed the networks in all three wards as separate “sub-
networks” instead of allowing them to merge, wards 1 and 2 would have continued to 
suffer significant data loss, and ward 3 would be less reliable as well. We state two chief 
design considerations: (1) Multiple base station and their spatial placement (i.e. not just 
relays spatial distribution) within WSNs are crucial for network connectivity and 
reliability. (2) Three-dimensional network topologies provide route diversity that 
enhances reliability in busy buildings, providing new path diversity and thus resiliency 
against possible interference by humans and other factors. 
 
Recommendations Deploy base stations for redundancy. If the physical 
environment allows, deploy the base stations such that 3D network form a resilient 
routing infrastructure. While it is possible to form 3D networks with relays alone we 
believe that there is more path diversity, rendering the network more resilient, when the 
base stations themselves offer a 3D paths to terminate on a different level than where 
the destination is. However, when it is not practical use multiple base stations, or to 
place them at different levels, it is an advantage to deploying the relays on multiple 
floors. A practical solution that may avoid the problem all together is to install the 
motes above people’s height. As a WSN community we can develop a simple 
“extension cord apparatus” that powers a mote using a cable extending from the power 
outlet to the ceiling height, where the mote would reside. This would allow motes to use 
communication airways that do not go through people, who absorb some of the 
electromagnetic radiation and thus interfere with the network operation.  
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5.2  Fault Tolerant Systems 
 
5.2.1 Integration Points  
 
Challenge Some software failures on a base station are particularly disruptive 
because, in contrast to hardware failures, the base station’s attached mote will continue 
to receive power and act as data sink. Under a hardware failure, relays would begin to 
re-route their data to another base station under the guidance of a protocol such as 
CTP. However, under software failures, the base stations effectively converts into a 
“black hole”: receiving power, the base station’s motes would still advertise themselves 
as data sinks, but, but lacking a client to consume the packets the mote would silently 
discard any incoming data. Hence, even circumstances beyond the control of the data 
collection system (such as an operating system failures on a base station) can lead to 
quality degradation. Such monitoring needs to become part of the system’s 
responsibility, despite the fact that the system is not working at the moment. 
Unfortunately, the nature of the failure means that we cannot estimate the amount of 
data lost to software failures in our current deployment. 
 
Recommendations The system design should incorporate fault detection and 
recovery mechanisms to deal with both software and hardware failures. We find such 
design intellectually stimulating in particular because we are asking a system to monitor 
events when the system itself is not working. For example in the case of the base 
station’s attached mote, it would turn into this “black hole” through which endless data 
would be lost when the base station software is not present to consume its data. Upon 
detection of a base station failure the gateway mote attached to the base station should 
stop broadcasting that it is a viable sink immediately. A specific challenge to the way 
motes are constructed today is posed because motes cannot query the server to which it 
is attached. The detection of such a fault can reside with the embedded software on the 
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mote or within the network because those are two components that are properly 
functioning in this particular example. Focusing on the part of the system that does 
work in this case yields a fault tolerant solution. The mote software should periodically 
be receiving status messages from the server and the arrival of such messages indicates 
that the software is in working condition. However, as soon as such messages stop to 
arrive, the mote should stop advertising itself as a viable sink. 
 
Similar mechanisms should be designed for each part of the system that may fail. In 
general we believe that the following design pattern can guide the thinking process. 
1. Identify a possible Faulty module of the system, F, which is not functioning 
under this scenario. 
2. Identify modules of the system does do work, Wi, under this this scenario. 
3. If a working module Wi can check a status flag on a non-functioning part F, 
then the lack of response indicates that F does not work. Otherwise, 
4. Design a simple message exchange protocol such that the lack of arrival of a 
message from F to Wi indicates that F does not work. 
 
5.2.2 Access to Individual Motes 
 
Challenge  Often during this long study we wished we had direct software access to 
an individual mote. Either to check its status, know its current location, or query its ID 
in order to return it to its original location. This is not possible with unidirectional (from 
leaves (relays) to the root (relay attached to the server)) protocols such as CTP, but it is 
possible with IPv6 (or similar address based) protocol. We consider the system’s ability 
to query individual components of its infrastructure part of its ability to respond in real-
time to events, and part of becoming a fault tolerant system. 
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Recommendations The advantages and disadvantages of address-less vs. address-
based protocols is a design decision, per the system particular goals. However, we 
recommend, for hospital clinical systems (or similar environment in which motes can be 
moved by people or get lost in a large spatial space) to use address-based protocols such 
as IPv6. The same recommendation holds if the CPS needs to be fault tolerant because 
the system needs to be aware of the constituents of its infrastructure. Address-based 
protocols allow access to each individual device in the network. However, this 
recommendation poses a new set of challenges for WSN based CPS. These challenges 
come from the inherent requirement of specifying a destination for each packet.  CTP’s 
advantage is that a packet is just being sent into the network and without flooding or 
broadcasting the packet will arrive to one of the base stations. Flooding and 
broadcasting are not energy efficient on any network, but this issue is more prominent 
in the context of WSN and its low energy goals. Additionally, specifying an address for 
each packet that is sent using an IPv6 or similar protocol, strips away one of the biggest 
advantages we have discovered in this trial – the base station redundancy. As a reminder 
(see section 5.1) we hypothesized that this will be a key contributor to network reliability 
in densely populated areas. It certainly was so in our trial. As the last design 
consideration we mention that broadcasting in the context of WSN lowers the system 
scalability by consuming its limited bandwidth. This Thesis is not the place for a new 
protocol design, nor we have enough information to even suggest that, but we intent to 
explore protocols that will marry benefits from the two approaches. 
 
5.3  Network Analysis 
 
5.3.1 Motes Numbering 
 
Challenge  Each mote in the network had a unique ID that identified its hardware 
in the cloud. This ID was used to denoted its physical location on the floor layout of the 
hospital. As noted elsewhere in this paper, in crowded environment motes will tend to 
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disappear and will need to be replaced. Those motes can also reappear in a different 
room in the hospital, which is the worse case scenario if you are interested in 
performing a network spatial analysis because this mote ID is associated with its original 
location. 
 
Solutions As soon as we noted that motes could be moved around we trained the 
hospital staff and our study coordinator about the importance of having a good track 
over motes locations. It is uncertain to what extent this was effective as we continued to 
experience motes disappearances until the end of the trial. This should be expected in 
environments where new people pass by every day. 
 
Recommendations Two cases should be considered whenever spatial network 
analysis is part of the study: 
(1) When a disappearing mote is replenished with new mote hardware, the new 
mote must be assigned the original mote ID. 
(2) If a mote ID appears in a new location, it should not be allowed to join the 
network before its ID is changed. 
We recommend separating the TinyOS Active Message ID (AM-ID) from the location 
ID discussed in this section. AM-ID in TinyOS is determined during compile time and 
becomes part of the object code. Using this ID as the location ID puts the burden of 
managing the inventory of location IDs on the researcher, which is error prone and 
inflexible because the ID is attached to a particular hardware. We recommend that a 
different set of IDs that can be dynamically assigned will be used for network spatial 
analysis. The Location-ID (LID) should be managed from a centralized location and an 
LID consumption mechanism should be developed. The following design objectives 
should be taken into account: 
• Mechanisms to automatically assign LIDs during the initial installation are 
required. These needs to include assigning LIDs to a large number of motes that 
have not yet joined the network. 
• A researcher that walks into the premises with a mote should not automatically 
consume a LID as this mote might be unrelated to this deployment. 
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• A mote should not continue to operate as a relay upon its disconnection from a 
power outlet. This can be managed by the mote’s disconnection alarm (see 
section 5.5.1). 
• Mechanisms to address (1) and (2) above are required. 
 
5.3.2 Motes Spatial Location 
 
Challenge  We found out that in a large study as ours, spanning over large areas, full 
of other equipment and people, it is not easy to find motes even if you know that they 
are in a certain room. To be attentive to other hospital priorities and mission we 
plugged our relay motes into any available power outlet that was not regularly used for 
medical equipment. We ended up with motes in different locations in each room, which 
made them hard to find. As a result when we looked for a mote in a room full of other 
hospital equipment we were often wondering whether it was removed from the room or 
we are just not looking in the right spot. 
 
Solutions In later stages of the trial we implemented the FRBL cardinal direction 
system described below. 
 
Recommendations In future deployment we recommend, based on the available 
power resources, that a couple of consistent locations would be preferred. Furthermore, 
each installed mote should be registered with the room number and spot in the room. 
One such simple scheme that proved beneficial for us is similar to the NESW cardinal 
direction system. We coined our system the FRBL cardinal direction. In this system we 
denote on which wall a mote is located relative to a person just entering the room and 
standing in the doorway. The letter F denotes that the mote is on the wall in Front of 
the entry door, B for Behind denotes the door’s wall (or just Behind the person entering 
the room), and R/L denote on the Right/Left wall respectively. Of course the known 
NESW can also be used where N denotes on front wall, E on the right wall, S is the 
   43 
 
back wall, and W on the left wall. However some people may find this odious because 
of the probable mismatch with Earth magnetic direction. 
5.4  End User Indicators 
 
Challenge  The patient wireless device we used for this trial was developed for a 
much smaller, previous study, in which it was used successfully. The larger scale of our 
study coupled with the fact that the patient populations in our study was very frail 
surfaced a usability design issue that we could not address in the middle of the trial. The 
existing patient device has no visual or audible indicators. There is no way to know if it 
is ON or OFF, there is no way to know if it is sensing vital signs (valid or not), and no 
battery level data is available. The lack of these statuses meant that they could not be 
sent to the research coordinator or be indicated on the device. 
  
Recommendations All of these issues will need to be addressed in future revisions 
of the patient device. For the author of this paper at least, as an engineer who is always 
trying to build minimalistic and functional hardware or software that does exactly what 
it is suppose to do, and no more – this was an excellent lesson in machine-user 
interaction. For me, putting numerous indicators would not be a question anymore. In a 
technological age as ours, where storage and to a good extent network bandwidth are 
not scarce resources anymore, I would even dare to say: the more meaningful indicators 
there are – the merrier. I draw the same conclusion for building hardware and software 
that exposes internal indicators (e.g. battery level) and building mechanisms that gives 
the system (and the users at the UI level) visibility to them. 
 
5.5  Impact of IT Procedures 
 
Challenge A common challenge for IT in many enterprise networks is ensuring 
data security and privacy while also giving users enough access to perform their jobs. 
When moving deployments from a test bed to an enterprise setting it is important to 
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work closely with IT to understand how these policies may affect the deployment. For 
example, we used laptops as base stations and thus this equipment was treated as end-
user equipment. In our case this meant the equipment was preinstalled with a disk image 
containing mandatory full disk encryption, user-level backups, and a centrally managed 
software updates policy was enforced. Shortly after the deployment we encountered 
unanticipated conflicts between these policies and our base stations’ normal activities, 
which were to be performed continuously and in real-time. The end-user level backup 
software, for example, would mandatory start and block the database server from its 
real-time work. As another example, after every patch update (e.g. OS, security) that 
required a reboot the base station would wait for the user to input a password to 
“unlock” the encrypted hard drive. 
 
Solutions We worked with IT to clarify that patient information on these base 
stations we sanitized according to HIPAA rules. Consequentially the base stations were 
exempted from full disk encryption and backups2, and reboots were reduced to once a 
month for critical patches. We also changed our software to run as an OS service so it 
will be started automatically after a reboot. 
 
Recommendations The integration to the hospital infrastructure and policies are 
two different objectives, and the integration-design process could be lengthy. These 
policies would require the system to have additional logic to handle these procedures 
and this logic may be unrelated to the core system’s functions. To incorporate these 
functions therefore, it is important to start discussions with the organizational IT during 
the system design. This may lead to selection of alternate equipment such as non-
portable or server-class machines, which falls under different policies and often use 
server-class software that is more suitable for continuous server work. It is also 
important to test the system on-site with the software functionality that accommodates 
the hospital policies; as such integration issues would not manifest themselves in 
standalone WSNs test bed. Some policies should be incorporated into the network 
                                                
2 Manual database backups were performed periodically using a utility provided by the database vendor. 
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design as well, e.g., proactively re-computing routes to avoid machines that are under 
temporary scheduled maintenance. 
 
5.6  Hospital Environment 
 
5.6.1 Relay Disconnections 
 
Challenge The relay devices and base station were initially deployed without any 
labels that indicate they were part of a clinical monitoring system. In the beginning of 
the deployment our relays, base stations, and base stations motes were repeatedly 
disconnected. The staff indicated that some devices were unplugged and set aside out of 
curiosity or suspicion. We also believe that some devices have been unplugged by 
cleaning staff who needed the power outlets since there was no indication that the 
device was important, nor was it plugged to the hospital medical-class power outlets. It 
is worth noting that our experience contradicts the common assumption that power is 
an unlimited resource in indoor WSN deployments because we may leverage available 
power outlets. Relying on power outlets involves the tradeoff of making the deployment 
susceptible to disconnections; similar issues were experienced in a residential study [24]. 
 
Solutions Labeling is crucially important. While we still experience relays 
disconnections to date, the frequency lowered dramatically after we labeled the relays. 
As shown in figure 5.1, new relay devices are now deployed with laminated labels. The 
label is designed to conceal the exposed circuit board, making them appear less 
suspicious. Similar labels have been attached to the base stations’ lids to discourage 
disconnections or personal use and prevent disconnections of their attached motes. 
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Figure 5.1 The relay device before and after labeling. 
 
5.6.2 Base Stations Disconnections 
 
Challenge During the trial, base stations were disconnected from the power, 
network, or attached motes. These base stations act as bridges between the WSN and 
the hospital’s CDR database and such disconnects degraded the quality of the system. 
Base station disconnections were particularly surprising: in contrast to the relay nodes, 
which were deployed in patient rooms and hallways, the base stations were in rooms 
only accessible to hospital staff. We soon discovered that location sends a message. 
 
Solutions We used laminated labels for the base stations, their attached motes, and 
power cables; as well as relays. 
 
Recommendations With these experiences in mind we have a number of 
recommendations: (1) Equipment should not only be able to perform its task but also 
professionally display its purpose (e.g., base stations should be server-class machines, as 
much for appearance, as for the robust hardware). (2) Equipment should be installed in 
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appropriate locations that discourage casual tampering, personal use, or disconnections. 
(3) Labels should clearly indicate that the base station is medical equipment. (4) Labels 
should warn against disconnection on cables near susceptible outlets or ports (when 
someone is under the desk looking for an Ethernet port or a power outlet they do not 
know which cable is medically important). 
 
5.6.3 Disconnection Alarm 
 
Challenge  We plugged our relay motes into power outlets but they did not always 
stay there. Operating under the assumption that our motes will have limitless power 
(being plugged into an outlet) we did not equip them with batteries. In a busy hospital it 
can be expected that devices will be unplugged and reappear in a different location or 
not plugged back at all. 
 
Solutions It was not practical for us to use a disconnection alarm because it would 
require someone to be present in the hospital at all times to attend to it and we were 
budgeted only for a part time study coordinator. 
 
Recommendations In future studies we recommend to equip the motes with 
batteries despite the fact they will be plugged into a power outlet. A disconnection 
mechanism can then send an alert, immediately upon disconnect, to a monitoring 
module of the system. We also believe that sounding an audio alert upon disconnection 
may encourage the person to return the mote to its place immediately. The battery will 
also allow the mote to stay in communication with the monitoring module and indicate 
its current location. The signal strength relevant to other motes, or even its path to the 
base station can be used as location indicators. 
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5.6.4 Professional Medical Standards 
 
Challenge There are a number of topics that fall under this category. They are all 
discussed in the recommendation section. 
 
Recommendations We already discussed using server-class machines as medical 
equipment in section 5.6.2. In fact, with our desire to run everything on standard 
hardware almost every project that uses regular computers for specialty-use (e.g. as 
medical equipment) runs the risk of being treated as a computer for surfing the Internet. 
During research, when it does not make sense to externally brand your equipment, one 
good course of action is to use machines that look a little bit different. Standardize on 
the same equipment in all locations, install them in “medically reserved spots”, and 
clearly label the equipment. This will brand your equipment as close as you can to a 
medical equipment during the research period and may prevent tampering with its 
operation. 
 
Health risks are a hazard that hospital staff is aware of, and is trained to deal with. 
However this may be new ground for computer scientists and engineers. Get trained 
before the deployment starts. Many, if not all, hospitals have a department responsible 
for sterilization procedures. Get in touch with them and be consulted on proper 
sterilization of the equipment between patients or before equipment is returned to the 
lab for maintenance (you may want to note that in the lab journal). This may be 
particularly important if other students or lab mates will use the equipment after the trial 
has ended. 
 
If your equipment is not disposable then after sterilization we recommend it would be 
sealed and packaged as appropriate. This makes the device (and the project as a whole) 
appear more professional. We also believe it will make the volunteers feel more 
comfortable because this is what they see when commercial equipment or utensils are 
used during their treatment.  
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Finally we recommend that you will get a lab coat, it usefully reduces the risk of carrying 
pathogens back to your car, office, or home; and it makes you part of the professional 
hospital team. 
 
5.7  Research Administration 
 
5.7.1 Lab Journal 
 
Challenge There are many events that transpire in a study that spans a long 
duration or large grounds. For example, patients may decide to stop wearing the device 
on their own or a base station may be shutdown by someone. To correlate events with 
the system or network performance we sifted through emails, but this is very 
inconvenient, time consuming, and inaccurate method. It is almost guaranteed that you 
will not find a record of everything that occurred during the trial. 
 
Solutions To the extent that we could, we archived every research related email in 
personal folders. Some people switched to gmail for its superior search. 
 
Recommendations A properly managed lab journal (paper based or electronic) will 
help you get closer to the truth when it comes to events in the project life. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Related Work 
 
Industry is offering wireless telemetry solutions such as the GE Healthcare’s ApexPro 
telemetry system [25], Sotera WIRELESS’s ViSi Mobile System [26], and Philips’s 
IntelliVue cableless solution [27]. Each of those technologies (and our own) presents 
different strengths and limitations. The commercial wireless solutions require an 
installation of dedicated infrastructure such as wired access points (i.e. a WiFi AP 
requires a wired Ethernet connection) which are labor intensive to install and costly. In 
contrast, WSN technology employs low-power wireless mesh networking that can be 
easily deployed without any fixed infrastructure (other than power outlets). The cost-
effectiveness and ease of deployment makes WSNs particularly attractive for resource 
constrained clinical settings such as field hospitals, rural areas, and developing countries. 
Lastly, these wireless technologies require more power than WSN, which is based on 
low-power wireless standards such as IEEE 802.15.4 [12]; hence portable devices based 
on low-power WSNs may be deployed with slimmer batteries or may require less 
frequent charging. 
 
Previous studies have found great promise in WSNs for emerging medical applications 
such as emergency care in disaster areas [4, 28, 29], assisted living and residential 
monitoring [6], and early detection of clinical deterioration [3, 4]. In contrast to the 
study described in this paper, these prior studies were deployed as standalone WSNs 
and were not integrated with the legacy hospital systems. Moreover, these deployments 
were limited to a single unit or a relatively small area. As we have seen in our study 
larger spans of WSN call for additional design considerations. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions 
 
Wireless networks have shown promise for real-time clinical monitoring in hospitals. In 
this work we evaluate the question whether a subset of wireless network, namely low-
power wireless, can be used to build a reliable clinical monitoring cyber physical system. 
We focus on low-power networks because of advantages such as easy deployment and 
energy consumption. This paper presents the lessons and insights learned from a 14-
month deployment of a large-scale WSN for vital sign monitoring in a major hospital. 
Salient features of our system are scale (spanning four hospital floors) and integration 
with existing IT infrastructure and CDR systems in a hospital. We present important 
and sometimes surprising findings that were not reported in previous WSN 
deployments in hospitals and other environments. (1) Base station placement is crucial 
for reliable data collection and allowing subnetworks to communicate with each other 
can effectively increase the overall system’s reliability and render it more resilient to 
hospital events. (2) Network reliability can be increased by designing for 3D network 
topologies. (3) Fault tolerant design is necessary to progress towards production-wordy 
CPS deployments. (4) Designing meaningful end-user indicators can make a positive 
impact on a CPS. (5) It is crucial to deal with equipment disconnections even in a well-
controlled hospital environment, and to establish protocols that recover and proactively 
discourage these disconnections. 
 
Our results lead to guidance and best practices of deploying large-scale WSNs in 
hospital environments and other large-scale WSNs. 
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